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Launch Services Program Overview 
_________________________ LAUNCH SERVICES PROGRAM __ 
• NASA LSP is responsible for the acquisition and program management of 
Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) launch services for a wide variety of US 
government civil spacecraft 
• NASA LSP performs mission assurance instead of buying launch insurance 
- Approach considers initial launch failure rate and benefit of government 
technical evaluation 
- Keenly aware of launch vehicle failure causes and applies technical resources 
accordingly 
• Deeply technical, experienced, stable government civilian workforce 
- Technical staff of approximately 200 including support contractors 
- Average government experience level in launch activities: 15 years 
- Current team has provided government go/no-go on every expendable launch vehicle 
(63) NASA has launched since 1998 
- 97% mission success rate since inception in 1998 
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_________________________ LAUNCH SERVICES PROGRAM __ 
• Can be awarded a qualifying contract before achieving first successful launch, but 
must wait until achieving a success to compete for an actual mission task order 
• Falcon 1, 1 E, 9, and Athena IC, IIC have not yet been awarded LSP missions 
- Are considered vehicles without significant US government involvement to date 
• Delta IV was on previous contract but was not awarded a mission by LSP 
• Delta II is not on the new LSP Contract 
- Was used for approximately 50% of NASA missions 
from 1990 to date 
- Last flight currently schedul 
October 2011 
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Why Perform Mission Assurance? 
__________________________ LAUNCH SERVICES PROGRAM __ 
• NASA assures mission success vs. insuring it because of overall mission value 
- Cost of LSP mission assurance is less than insurance for moderate and high cost missions 
Insurance payments could allow NASA to conduct another mission, but the specific mission 
objective would often be lost 
• Ratio of spacecraft to Launch Vehicle costs is higher than commercial industry 
- Very few lower cost missions with spacecraft value of $1 OOM on a -$40M launch service 
- Typical spacecraft is $400M to $600M looking for a $100M launch service 
- Planetary missions require larger LV's with service costs of $150M to $300M 
- Most expensive missions are $1 B+ (have launched a $1 B mission on an $80M service) 
• Not allowed to directly purchase insurance 
- In some cases have used delivery-on-orbit with a re-flight provision with assumption that the 
commercial launch company secures insurance to meet their re-flight obligation 
- Commercial launch companies say they insure the LSP imposed launch failure penalty of 
25% of the launch service contract price 
• Commercial launch provider must have 3rd party liability insurance 
- To the maximum amount available in "the commercial marketplace" at a reasonable cost, but 
NTE $500M for each launch 
- Analogous to the FAA's insurance requirement which obligates the provider to purchase 5 
insurance for 3rd party claims to the FAA's maximum probable loss determination for licensed 
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Delta II GPS Launch Failure Video 
_____________________ LAUNCH SERVICES PROGRAM __ 
• From Youtube 
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• 
• Overall 
NASA Customers 
expect >95% and 
LSP has delivered 
almost 97% since 
inception in 1998 
• Overall success rate for US vehicles without US Government involvement is 
low because these vehicles don't last in the market place and/or the US 
government buys them and starts to become involved 
• Two recent NASA LSP failures were flights 2 and 3 of the Taurus XL brining 7 
down the US Government rate for flights 1-3 and the overall LSP rate 
World ELV Launch History 
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USA ELV LAUNCH SUCCESS HISTORY 
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Failure Causes 
__________________________ LAUNCH SERVICES PROGRAM __ 
• Agency wide team in 2003 used LSP launch database, failure reports, USG 
Broad Area Review, and other industry failure studies looking back to mid '70's 
• The predominant root cause of failures worldwide is in propulsion subsystems 
- Many liquid propulsion failures occurred during a start of an upper stage system 
- Flight controls (software, autopilot and/or actuators) and separation systems are the next 
leading causes 
• The majority of failures were related to systems engineering, engineering 
design robustness, and/or disconnect in carrying out engineering intent as a 
result of process/culture problems 
• Some of the failures studied might have been prevented by a more thorough 
independent analysis and review, test like you fly, attention to out-of-sequence 
operations, better systems engineering understanding of each component and 
of small changes, or better inspection 
• Paying attention to flight data and relating it back to development activities is 
critical 
Predominant Launch Vehicle Failures Characteristics mid 1970's thru 2003 
each failure can have more than Process System Operations Reliability 
one attribute Culture Design 
Total 29 25 18 16 
liquid Core Vehicles 22 18 15 13 
Vehicles wi U.S. Gov Involvement 15 12 12 10 9 
Evolution of LSP Mission Assurance 
into Mission Excellence 
__________________________ LAUNCH SERVICES PROGRAM __ 
• $500M for a launch service with 100% demonstrated 
reliability wouldn't meet all of NASA's needs, nor 
would $50M for a service with <95% 
• Must elevate program management functions (cost 
and schedule) to match technical performance for 
missions to be fully successful 
• Must add value by lowering risk and build trust in 
relationships with stakeholders 
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Key Points for Technical Performance and 
NASA Oversight 
_______________________ LAUNCH SERVICES PROGRAM __ 
• NASA LSP provides common level of technical oversight over different 
commercial launch vehicles using independent technical assessments free from 
programmatic considerations 
• Processes are strong and yet flexible, across diverse providers and missions 
• Technical Oversight Policy Directive 8610.23 seeks to ensure "the highest 
practicable probability of launch success by involvement in, and control of, the 
launch through technical oversight" which is limited in approval but has 
widespread insight 
• Program Manager has the sole authority to accept risk and can/does ask for 
alternate technical recommendations based on cost, schedule or mission risk 
posture 
• NASA retains the right to non-concur with the contractor's proposed actions 
based upon technical knowledge obtained through insight process 11 
LSP Technical Team 
_______________________ LAUNCH SERVICES PROGRAM __ 
• LSP has a lean, highly knowledgeable and experienced technical team 
• LSP Engineers are required to understand the specifics of not only the relevant 
NASA technical standards, but also those of comparable military, commercial, 
and corporate-internal standards 
• Establish partnerships with other agencies (USAF, NRO etc) on mission 
assurance and lessons learned from launch failures 
--- ----
Technical Policy Directive 8610.7 is Used to 
Direct Non Recurring Assessment of New LVs 
_~~~~~~~~~~~~ ... _~~~~~~~_~~~ __ LAUNCH SERVICES PROGRAM __ _ 
• NPD 8610.7 NASA Risk Mitigation Policy: " NASA launch vehicle assignment and acquisition 
strategy seeks to balance launch risk for individual missions with launch vehicle demonstrated 
flight history and NASA technical penetration consistent with overall mission risk" 
• Provides a strong foundation for the LSP Insight and Approval (recurring work) as required by 
NPD 8610.23 (Technical Insight and Approval) 
Spacecraft Launch Vehicle May Launch On 
Classification Category 
Class D Category 1 - May be the first flight on a New launch vehicle 
Low cost and simple High Risk LV configuration with no previous flight history 
Not normally launched - Very limited NASA technical review 
Potentially "replaceable" on the LSP Contract 
Class C (and B in rare cases) Category 2 - Requires at least one success (up to 3) of a 
Moderate cost and complexity "common launch vehicle configuration" 
Medium Risk LV - Meaningful NASA LSP technical evaluation 
By itself not critical to 
- Extensive verification of margins from flight data and 
achieving a major NASA resolution of all flight anomalies and observations 
objective 
Class A and B Category 3 - Requires at least 3 or 6 success of a "common 
High cost and/or complexity launch vehicle configuration" 
Low Risk LV - Major NASA technical evaluation for 3 flight method, 
Most NASA missions are meaningful evaluation for 6 flight method 
class B Designed to assure - Extensive verification of margins from flight data and 
highest practicable resolution of all flight anomalies and observations 
probability of success - May require 14 consecutive successful flights in 
some cases without extensive technical evaluation 
Key Technical Items in Certification 
______________________ LAUNCH SERVICES PROGRAM __ 
• Conduct Launch Vehicle Hardware Qualification and Acceptance Test 
Engineering Review Boards 
• Comprehensive LSP conducted independent analyses (IV&V) 
• LSP ERB verifies that the demonstrated vehicle configuration flight met the 
predicted vehicle and performance parameters within three sigma criteria 
comparing with qualification test results 
• Require Launch Supplier to perform a full vehicle Ishikawa Fishbone Analysis 
• Design Certification Review is a tool that effectively requires a CDR after the 
basic configuration has completed build, test flight and anomaly resolution 
Specialty Areas 
LSP Advisory Services 
_________________________ LAUNCH SERVICES PROGRAM __ 
• Most NASA missions are best served with full launch services acquired by the 
LSP, however, recognize that not all missions can go this route 
• Over the past 4 years LSP has developed areas of specific insight and offered 
them to a mission if a full launch service isn't purchased 
- Offering advisory services, but not inserting ourselves without customer request 
- Document each .advisory service separately to define responsibilities and resources required 
- Because mission assurance is a complex combination of the full complement of LSP 
services, won't take overall mission assurance responsibility when in an advisory role 
• Examples of documented advisory services 
- GOES-O/P on Delta IV on FAA licensed mission 
- James Webb Space Telescope (JWST): Foreign Cooperative mission on Ariane V 
- Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM): Foreign Cooperative mission on H-IIA 
- COTS Phase I on Falcon 9 and Taurus 2 
- ISS Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) on Falcon 9 
- LADEE Supplemental Advisory and Risk Team (SMART) for Minotaur V 
• Is there a way for the launch insurance community to work together with NASA LSP? 
- Advisory services could be offered if there is some benefit to the US Government 
- LSP is interested in understanding what risk items insurance community sees and how they 
are quantified 
- darren.m.bedell@nasa.oov 15 
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Potential back up material · 
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Alternate Launch Provider Approach 
2006 Study of New Providers 
_______________ IIIIIIiIIII _______ LAUNCH SERVICES PROGRAM __ 
• LSP offers unfunded Space Act Agreements for interested and qualified 
companies/vehicles 
- Criteria includes SRR maturity, supplier existing funding, viable launch date 
- No agreement for Falcon 1 or 9 needed because they are on contract 
- Existing service contractors can obtain SAA's for vehicles not on contract 
Alternative Launch Provider - defined to be any launch service contractor that is not 
currently on contract with NASA Launch Services Program 
Goal: Framework to consider Launch Service options LSP might pursue to strengthen 
our portfolio 
e omparison of Launch Vehicle Success Rates 
______________________________ LAUNCH SERVICES PROGRAM __ _ 
The value of independent technical evaluation is clearly shown by historical data 
ELV Fleets US ELV NASA Ariane 4 and 5 Soyuz HII,HIIA 
with Fleets Missions and and HII B 
Significant without with full Molniya 
USGov Significant policy Family 
Involvement US Gov implemented 
Involvement 95.95% total success 
Ariane 4 Ariane 5 
Period of Jan 1990- March Jan 1990- Jan 1990- June 1988- June 1996- Jan 1990- Feb 1994-
Perf 2011 March 2011 March 2011 Feb 2003 March 2011 May 2007 March 2011 
Successl 327/341 27138 92/95 113/116 53156 280/283 24126 
Total 
Success 95.5% 71 .1% 96.8% 97.41% 94.6% 98.94% 92.3% 
Rate 
Infant 
Success 
Flights 1-3 83.7%% (36/43) 64 .3% (18/28) 2 recent failures 100% 67% (4/6) 100% (8/8) 
Flights 1-6 89.4% 69.2% 100% 83.3% (10/12) 85.7% 
Flights 4-6 95.2% (40/42) 81 .8% (9/11) 100% 100% 67% (4/6) 
Note that Atlas I (3 of6; 1990) and Pegasus XL (4 of6; 1994) bring down the infant success rate of ELY fleets 
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Worldwide Commercial Space Launches 
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something to bring back US 
commercial market? 
Would this make a difference 
30 to science market? 
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